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Multi-issueAbstract In this paper, a mathematical model with flexible negotiation strategies for agent based
negotiations is developed which can be applied suitably in bilateral/multilateral multi-issue negoti-
ation environments. Unlike the existing approaches for offer value computation for the negotiation
issues, this model considers not only the reservation values but also the offer values proposed in the
preceding negotiation round. This approach for offer value computation enables the traders to
reach consensus much quicker than the existing approaches. This model considers the compelling
urge of the trader in buying/selling a product based on which the reservation values are adjusted
automatically at the end of the negotiation process in order to reach consensus in a deal which is
otherwise not possible. The formula devised in this model to determine the concession speed of each
negotiation issue handles the dynamicity of the negotiation environment and reflects the importance
of each negotiation issue from the traders’ perspective. The effectiveness of the proposed strategies
is evaluated using various hypothetical cases representing the real-world negotiation scenarios in an
e-commerce environment. The test results show that the proposed negotiation strategies are able to
optimize the utility process and also improve the rate of reaching consensus in the negotiation pro-
cess.
 2016 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In the current scenario, business transactions have become
unthinkable without Internet services, thanks to its cheaper
cost and wide bandwidth availability. It becomes inevitable
for any business to embrace e-services to exploit the advan-
tages of internet technologies in order to survive in the compet-
itive market. The development of e-shopping portals
transformed the traditional way of buying and selling goods
into a more convenient, cost and time saving benefits for bothynamic
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issues including security, trust, reputation, law, payment mech-
anisms, advertising, ontologies, on-line catalogues, and back-
office management. Agent technologies can be applied to any
of these areas where a personalized, continuously running,
semi-autonomous behaviour is desirable (Guttman et al.,
1998). A software agent is a computational entity which per-
ceives, acts upon its environment and is autonomous in its
behaviour (Weiss, 1999). Negotiation in e-commerce domain
is an emerging topic of research. There are a considerable num-
ber of research works being carried out in designing automated
negotiators capable of making autonomous decisions depend-
ing upon the prevailing e-market situations. Design of auto-
mated negotiators involves three major operations such as
identifying the negotiation objects, defining the negotiation
protocols, and devising the agent’s decision making models
(Jennings et al., 2001). The negotiating agents are capable of
exchanging proposals, evaluating proposals, and also accept-
ing or rejecting proposals to reach mutual deals (Chen and
Huang, 2009). Faratin et al. (1998) named the sequence of
offers and counter-offers in a two-party negotiation as a nego-
tiation thread and also proposed to implement multi-party,
many issues negotiations as multiple concurrent threads.
Sim and Wang (2004) designed negotiation agents that
employ fuzzy rules to provide flexibility in making concessions
to reflect the changing market conditions. He and Jennings
(2004) proposed the design of intelligent bidding agent that
uses fuzzy techniques to make bidding decisions in the face
of uncertainty, to make predictions about the likely outcomes
of auctions, and to alter the agent’s bidding strategy in
response to the prevailing market conditions. Matos et al.
(1998) adopted an evolutionary approach by mapping the
strategies and tactics to the genetic material in a genetic algo-
rithm and showed the relative success of different strategies
against different types of opponents in different environments.
Lau et al. (2008) proposed a negotiation knowledge discovery
method based upon non-parametric approach that supports
multi-party many-issue negotiation situations in dynamic
negotiation environment and a probabilistic negotiation deci-
sion making mechanism to improve the performance of nego-
tiation agents.
Narayanan and Jennings (2005) developed a negotiation
model that can adapt the agent’s strategy in response to
resources availability and variation in negotiation parameters.
Kwon (2009) proposed a two-step approach for bilateral
multi-attribute consensus formation by developing an algo-
rithm based on collaborative learning theory at step one to rec-
ognize the negotiation feasible space and then reducing the
time taken for optimization at step two. Ren et al. (2009)
extended Market-Driven Agents (MDA) negotiation models
by designing agent negotiation strategies that are capable of
making adjustable rates of concession in an open and dynamic
negotiation environment.
Wang and Wong (2013) proposed a three-staged adaptive
negotiation behaviour configuration mechanism to tackle the
negotiation dynamics and provided a computational model
to organize agent-based e-commerce negotiations with adap-
tive negotiation behaviours. Ren and Zhang (2014) proposed
a negotiation model to dynamically modify agents’ negotiation
behaviours based upon the changes in the number of partici-
pants in the e-market and the agents’ motivation on accom-
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appraise the performance of intelligent agents and demonstrate
the use in the B2C e-commerce negotiation process. Baarslag
et al. (2011) summarized the result of ANAC 2011 competition
which aims to advance the state-of-the-art in the area of prac-
tical bilateral multi-issue negotiations, and to encourage the
design of agents that are able to operate effectively across a
variety of negotiation scenarios. Chen and Weiss (2015) pro-
posed a negotiation approach called OMAC*, the decision
making component of which adaptively adjusts its utility
expectations and negotiation moves by enabling the agents
to efficiently model opponents in real-time through discrete
wavelet transformation and non-linear regression with the
Gaussian processes. OMAC* outperformed the top agents
from ANAC 2012, 2011 and 2010 in a broad range of negoti-
ation scenarios. Patrikar et al. (2015) proposed a multilateral
automated negotiation system based upon linear programming
and pattern matching techniques that outperforms negotiation
systems based upon fuzzy inference logic, multithreading, lin-
ear programming and genetic algorithm.
Deployment of automated negotiators in e-commerce trans-
actions greatly reduces the human efforts and time consumed.
The design of automated negotiators involve the consideration
of various issues including the number of parties – bilateral or
multilateral (one buyer/one seller, one buyer/many sellers,
many buyers/one seller, many buyers/many sellers) involved
in the negotiation process, the number of negotiation issues
(price, date of delivery, warranty, etc) on which mutual
agreements are to be achieved, the number of negotiation
rounds – fixed/variable and partial/complete/no knowledge
on opponents negotiation strategies and priorities. As the real
e-market is dynamic in nature, an automated negotiator
embedded with fixed negotiation scheme cannot outperform
well compared to the ones that are capable of adopting flexible
negotiation schemes depending upon the current e-market
situation in order to emerge as the ultimate winner.
In this paper, a mathematical model with the flexible
negotiation strategies is being devised which can be applied
to generate proposals/counter proposals basically in bilateral
(one buyer – one seller) single-issue/multi-issue negotiation
environments. In case of multilateral negotiation environments
where there could be one-to-many, many-to-one, many-
to-many buyer/seller combinations, the same model can be
applied to generate required number of proposals/counter pro-
posals simultaneously on a one-to-one basis. Flexibility in the
proposed negotiation strategy is also achieved by making it
suitable for the negotiation environments that are based on
either a specific time limit or a number of negotiation rounds.
The remaining content of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 introduces the mathematical model for the agent
based negotiation strategies. Section 3 illustrates the effective-
ness of the proposed strategies with hypothetical cases repre-
senting real world trading environment. Section 4 concludes
the paper by identifying the future direction of further
research.2. Mathematical model with flexible negotiation strategies
Bilateral negotiations in an e-commerce environment involve
two parties: a buyer and a seller. The negotiation begins when
either the buyer/seller makes a proposal for the product toodel with flexible negotiation strategies for agent based negotiations in dynamic
ation Sciences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2016.11.004
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and it will be either accepted or the opponent will generate a
counter proposal. This process will continue until both the par-
ties reach consensus or the time elapses.
2.1. Significant features of the proposed model
The proposed model has the following significant features:
 It enables the traders to simultaneously involve in the nego-
tiation process of buying/selling a collection of distinct
products.
 It enables the traders to negotiate on a number of issues
such as price, delivery time, warranty, etc. of the product
to buy/sell.
 It enables the traders to assign weights for each negotiation
issue under consideration representing their relative impor-
tance during the negotiation process.
 It enables the traders to choose a range of acceptable values
for each of the negotiation issue under consideration which
are termed as ‘reservation values’.
 It also takes into account the compelling urge of the trader
in buying/selling a product which is used in adjusting the
offer values in order to complete the deal.
 It generates proposals/counter proposals which contain
offer values for each negotiation issue.
 It identifies a suitable offer value for each issue from among
the reservation values for making a proposal/counter pro-
posal depending upon the negotiation environment.
 It exclusively defines a parameter to determine the conces-
sion speed of each negotiation issue. This parameter han-
dles the dynamicity of the negotiation environment
(demand/supply ratio of a particular product) and reflects
the importance of each negotiation issue from the traders’
perspective.
 It proposes negotiation strategies that are suitable for nego-
tiation environments based upon a specific time limit or a
number of negotiation rounds.
 It determines the benefit of the proposed offer/counter offer
value of each negotiation issue by computing a numerical
score for it.
 It evaluates a proposal/counter proposal by computing a
numerical score for it.
 It distinguishes between cost type and benefit type issues as
the objective of the buyer is to minimize the cost and max-
imize the benefit and vice versa for the seller. According to
the type of issue, the scores are computed in order to opti-
mize the utility of the trader.
 Depending upon the compelling urge of the trader to buy/
sell the product, the model adjusts the maximum acceptable
value for cost type issues and minimum acceptable value for
benefit type issues of the buyer and vice versa for the seller.
 The modified reservation values are applied only at the end
of the negotiation process in order to verify the possibility
of reaching consensus.
2.2. Notations used in the proposed model
i. fP igni¼1 – The list of n products fP 1; P 2; P 3; . . .g to buy/
sell.Please cite this article in press as: Haleema, P.K., Iyengar, N.C.S.N. A mathematical m
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m
j¼1 – The list of m issues of product P i such as
fPPrice1 ; PWarranty1 ; P leadtime1 ; . . .g on which negotiation is to
be carried out.
iii. fW ji g
m
j¼1 – The list of weights assigned to m negotiation
issues of product P i indicating their relative importance.
It is assumed that the sum of all weights is equal to1.odel w
ation SXm
j¼1
Wji ¼ 1iv. fminðP ji Þ;maxðP ji Þg
m
j¼1 – The list of reservation values
(range of acceptable values) preferred for the m negoti-
ation issues of product P i.
v. fpap ji g
m
j¼1 – The compelling urge of the trader to buy/sell
the product P i is indicated by a percentage termed as
Preference Adjustment Percentage (pap) which can be
used to modify the reservation values of each negotia-
tion issue j in order to reach an agreement.
vi. c ji – A positive real number, the value of which determi-
nes the concession speed of issue j of product P i. When
c ji  1, the concession rate is very high initially and then
gradually reduces and when c ji  1, the concession rate
is very low initially and then gradually increases.
  9
c ji ¼ No: of SellersNo: of Buyers þWji ; at Buyer end
c ji ¼ No: of BuyersNo: of Sellers
 
þWji ; at Seller end
>=
>;
ð1Þ
This formula is devised to handle the dynamicity of the
negotiation environment and to reflect the importance
of each negotiation issue from the trader’s perspective.vii. NB!St ðP iÞ – Negotiation of the Buyer Agent (B) with the
Seller Agent (S) for the product P i at time/negotiation
round t which contains offer values for a list of m issues
under consideration.
viii. CNS!Bt ðP iÞ – Counter Negotiation of S to B for the one
submitted at time/negotiation round t.
ix. xB!St ðP ji Þ – An offer value computed by B for the issue j
of product P i from the range of its acceptable values for
submission to S at t.
x. xS!Bt ðP ji Þ – Counter offer value computed by S for sub-
mission to B for issue j of product P i at t.
xi. NSðxB!St ðP ji ÞÞ – Numerical Score of the offer value
xB!St ðP ji Þ.
xii. NSðxS!Bt ðP ji ÞÞ – Numerical Score of the counter offer
value xS!Bt ðP ji Þ.
xiii. NSPB!St – Numerical Score of the proposal N
B!S
t ðP iÞ.
xiv. NSPS!Bt – Numerical Score of the counter proposal
CNS!Bt ðP iÞ
2.3. Formulating and evaluating proposals/counter proposals of
both buyer and seller
2.3.1. Buyer’s initial proposal
As the objective of the buyer is to minimize the cost and max-
imize the benefit during the negotiation process, the offer val-
ues for the various negotiation issues are computed depending
upon their type in order to optimize the utility of the buyer.ith flexible negotiation strategies for agent based negotiations in dynamic
ciences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2016.11.004
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m
j¼1 ð2Þ
where
xB!St ðPji Þ ¼ minðPji Þ þ KtðmaxðPji Þ
minðPji ÞÞ ðFor cost type issuesÞ ð3Þ
xB!St ðPji Þ ¼ maxðPji Þ  KtðmaxðPji Þ
minðPji ÞÞ ðFor benefit type issuesÞ ð4Þ
where Kt ¼ ðt=rÞc
j
i if the negotiation environment is based
upon a number of negotiation rounds.
t – Current negotiation round; r – Total No. of negotiation
rounds;
Otherwise Kt ¼ tendtttot
 c j
i
if the negotiation environment is
based upon a specific time limit.
tend – Closing time of the negotiation process.
ttot – Total time duration of the negotiation process.
t – Current time in the negotiation process.
2.3.2. Buyer’s subsequent proposal
xB!St ðPji Þ ¼ xB!St1 ðPji Þ þ KtðmaxðPji Þ
 xB!St1 ðPji ÞÞ ðFor cost type issuesÞ ð5Þ
xB!St ðPji Þ ¼ xB!St1 ðPji Þ  KtðxB!St1 ðPji Þ
minðPji ÞÞ ðFor benefit type issuesÞ ð6Þ2.3.3. Computation of numerical score of Buyer’s proposal
NSPB!St ¼
Xm
j¼1
NSðxB!St ðPji ÞÞWji ð7Þ
where
NSðxB!St ðPji ÞÞ ¼
maxðPji Þ  xB!St ðPji Þ
maxðPji Þ minðPji Þ
ðFor cost type issuesÞ
ð8Þ
NSðxB!St ðPji ÞÞ¼
xB!St ðPji ÞminðPji Þ
maxðPjiÞminðPji Þ
ðFor benefit type issuesÞ
ð9Þ2.3.4. Computation of NSPB!Stend
Depending upon the compelling urge of the trader to buy a
product, the maximum acceptable value is increased for cost
type issues and minimum acceptable value is decreased for
benefit type issues by a percentage (pap ji – preference adjust-
ment percentage for each issue j of product Pi) indicated by
the trader. This adjustment is done only at the end of the nego-
tiation process in order to check the possibility of accepting the
offer instead of rejecting it.Please cite this article in press as: Haleema, P.K., Iyengar, N.C.S.N. A mathematical m
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j
i ÞmaxðPji Þ ðFor cost type issuesÞ
ð10Þ
min ðPji Þtend ¼ ð1 pap
j
i ÞminðPji Þ ðFor benefit type issuesÞ
ð11Þ
xB!Stend ðP
j
i Þ ¼ xB!Stend1ðP
j
i Þ þ Ktend ðmax ðPji Þtend
 xB!Stend1ðP
j
i ÞÞ ðFor cost type issuesÞ ð12Þ
xB!Stend ðP
j
i Þ ¼ xB!Stend1ðP
j
i Þ  Ktend ðxB!Stend1ðP
j
i Þ
minðPji ÞtendÞ ðFor benefit type issuesÞ ð13Þ
NSðxB!Stend ðP
j
i ÞÞ¼
maxðPji Þtend xB!Stend ðP
j
i Þ
maxðPji Þtend minðP
j
i Þ
ðFor cost type issuesÞ
ð14Þ
NSðxB!Stend ðP
j
iÞÞ¼
xB!Stend ðP
j
iÞminðPjiÞtend
maxðPjiÞminðPjiÞtend
ðForbenefit type issuesÞ
ð15Þ
NSPB!Stend ¼
Xm
j¼1
NSðxB!Stend ðP
j
i ÞÞWji ð16Þ2.3.5. Seller’s initial proposal
As the objective of the seller is to maximize the cost and min-
imize the benefit during the negotiation process, the issue val-
ues for the various negotiation issues are computed depending
upon their type in order to optimize the utility of the seller.
NS!Bt ðPiÞ ¼ fxS!Bt ðPji Þg
m
j¼1 ð17Þ
where
xS!Bt ðPji Þ ¼ maxðPji Þ  KtðmaxðPji Þ
minðPji ÞÞ ðFor cost type issuesÞ ð18Þ
xS!Bt ðPji Þ ¼ minðPji Þ þ KtðmaxðPji Þ
minðPji ÞÞ ðFor benefit type issuesÞ ð19Þ2.3.6. Seller’s subsequent proposal
xS!Bt ðPji Þ ¼ xS!Bt1 ðPji Þ  KtðxS!Bt1 ðPji Þ
minðPji ÞÞ ðFor cost type issuesÞ ð20Þ
xS!Bt ðPji Þ ¼ xS!Bt1 ðPji Þ þ KtðmaxðPji Þ
 xS!Bt1 ðPji ÞÞ ðFor benefit type issuesÞ ð21Þ2.3.7. Computation of numerical score of Seller’s proposal
NSPS!Bt ¼
Xm
j¼1
NSðxS!Bt ðPji ÞÞWji ð22Þodel with flexible negotiation strategies for agent based negotiations in dynamic
ation Sciences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2016.11.004
Table 1 Preferences of the Buyer/Seller over the negotiation issues Price and Warranty.
Buyer’s preferences Seller’s preferences
Issue min max weight pap c min max weight pap c
Price 200 300 0.8 0.2 1.8 250 400 0.7 0.3 1.7
Warranty 30 48 0.2 0.2 1.2 24 36 0.3 0.2 1.3
Table 2 Description of the Negotiation algorithm with the hypothetical data.
Mathematical model with flexible strategies for agent based negotiations 5
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Table 2 (continued)
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Table 2 (continued)
Mathematical model with flexible strategies for agent based negotiations 7where
NSðxS!Bt ðPji ÞÞ ¼
xS!Bt ðPji Þ minðPji Þ
maxðPji Þ minðPji Þ
ðFor cost type issuesÞ
ð23Þ
NSðxS!Bt ðPji ÞÞ¼
maxðPji ÞxS!Bt ðPji Þ
maxðPji ÞminðPji Þ
ðFor benefit type issuesÞ
ð24Þ2.3.8. Computation of NSPS!Btend
min ðPji Þtend ¼ ð1 pap
j
i ÞminðPji Þ ðFor cost type issuesÞ
ð25Þ
max ðPji Þtend ¼ ð1þ pap
j
i ÞmaxðPji Þ ðFor benefit type issuesÞ
ð26ÞPlease cite this article in press as: Haleema, P.K., Iyengar, N.C.S.N. A mathematical m
e-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer and InformxS!Btend ðP
j
i Þ ¼ xS!Btend1ðP
j
i Þ  KtendðxS!Bt1 ðPji Þ
minðPji ÞtendÞ ðFor cost type issuesÞ ð27Þ
xS!Btend ðP
j
i Þ ¼ xS!Btend1ðP
j
i Þ þ KtendðmaxðPji Þtend
 xS!Bt1 ðPji ÞÞ ðFor benefit type issuesÞ ð28Þ
NSðxS!Btend ðP
j
i ÞÞ¼
xS!Btend ðP
j
i ÞminðPjiÞtend
maxðPji ÞminðPji Þtend
ðFor cost type issuesÞ
ð29Þ
NSðxS!Btend ðP
j
iÞÞ¼
maxðPjiÞtendxS!Btend ðP
j
iÞ
maxðPjiÞtendminðP
j
iÞ
ðForbenefit type issuesÞ
ð30Þ
NSPS!Btend ¼
Xm
j¼1
NSðxS!Btend ðP
j
i ÞÞWji ð31Þodel with flexible negotiation strategies for agent based negotiations in dynamic
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1. Buyer Agent B reads values for fP igni¼1; fP ji g
m
j¼1; fW ji g
m
j¼1;
fhminðP ji Þ;maxðP ji Þig
m
j¼1 and fpap ji g
m
j¼1.
2. B computes the value of c ji and identifies the value of ttot or
r depending upon the negotiation environment.
3. B generates initial proposal NB!St ðP iÞ and submits to the
Seller Agent S.
4. B receives the counter proposal CNS!Bt ðP iÞ from S and
evaluates it by computing the numerical score NSPB!St of
Seller’s counter proposal.
5. Buyer does the following assessments:
i. If t ¼ tendort ¼ r then compute NSPB!Stend .
a) If NSPS!Bt P NSP
B!S
tend
, then accept the offer.
b) Else reject the offer.Tabl
Conc
Nego
Buye
Seller
Nego
Buye
Seller
Tabl
Conc
Nego
Buye
Seller
Nego
Buye
Seller
Please
e-commii. Else, generate NB!Stþ1 ðP iÞ.
a) If NSPS!Bt P NSP
B!S
tþ1 , then accept the offer.
b) Else, submit NB!Stþ1 ðP iÞ, t = t + 1; go to step 4.2.5. Description of the negotiation algorithm with the
hypothetical data
Here we consider a bilateral negotiation environment with a
Buyer Agent B and a Seller Agent S. B is interested in buying
a product P1 by negotiating on the issues {Price, Warranty}
with S. The preferences of the buyer and seller on the negoti-
ation issues under consideration are given in Table 1. Table 2
demonstrates the step-by-step instruction in the negotiation
algorithm using the hypothetical data given in Table 1.
3. Results & findings
In the conventional models, computation of offer values for
each negotiation issue while generating proposals/counter pro-
posals involve only the consideration of reservation values. But
in the proposed model, the offer values for each negotiatione 4 Offer value of Negotiation Issue ‘Warranty’ – Our Model
ession Steps 1 2 3 4
tiation Issue – Warranty – Our Model (Consensus reached at Step 5
r 46.86 44.42 41.02 37.35
24.60 26.01 28.10 30.50
tiation Issue – Warranty – Conventional Model (Consensus reached a
r 46.86 45.39 43.76 42.01
24.60 25.48 26.51 27.65
e 3 Offer value of Negotiation Issue – ‘Price’ – Our Model Vs
ession Steps 1 2 3 4
tiation Issue ‘Price’ – Our Model (Consensus reached at step 7)
r 201.58 207.02 217.66 233.49
397.01 387.48 369.72 344.51
tiation Issue ‘Price’ – Conventional Model (Consensus reached at ste
r 201.58 205.52 211.45 219.22
397.01 390.28 380.63 368.41
cite this article in press as: Haleema, P.K., Iyengar, N.C.S.N. A mathematical m
erce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer and Informissue in the subsequent proposals are computed by taking into
consideration the offer values quoted in the preceding pro-
posal. The offer values computed based upon our model and
the conventional model for the negotiation issues ‘Price’ and
‘Warranty’ during a negotiation process with a maximum of
10 concession steps, i.e. r = 10, are shown in Table 3 and
Table 4 respectively and the same data are projected in Figs. 1
and 2. From the empirical results, it is clear that our model
helps the traders to reach consensus in the negotiation process
much earlier than the conventional model and it also increases
the utility of the traders.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the comparison between our model and
conventional models in computation of offer values for the
issues ‘Price’ and ‘Warranty’ respectively in a negotiation sce-
nario with a maximum of 200 concession steps i.e. r = 200.
From the results, it is clear that even with the increased no.
of negotiation rounds, our model outperforms well when com-
pared with the conventional models.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the comparison between our model and
conventional models in computation of offer values for the
issues ‘Price’ and ‘Warranty’ respectively when maintaining a
fixed concession speed i.e. c ji ¼ 0:5 for all the negotiation issues
at both buyer and seller end. The experimental results prove
that our model not only improves the utility of the traders
but also helps them in reaching consensus much quicker than
the conventional models.
The mathematical model proposed in this paper also uses a
parameter called ‘Preference Adjustment Percentage – pap’ to
adjust the reservation values depending upon the compelling
urge of the trader to buy/sell a product. This adjustment is
done only at the end of the negotiation process to check the
possibility of reaching consensus. Consider the reservation val-
ues of seller for the issues ‘Price’ and ‘Warranty’ as f350; 500g
and f18; 24g respectively. In this case, the traders will not be
able to reach consensus as per the conventional model. But
the proposed model will adjust the reservation values as per
the given ‘pap’ during the final round and completes the deal.
The offer values for the issues ‘Price’ and ‘Warranty’ are com-
puted using Eqs. (12) and (13) in the final negotiation round
and it is shown in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. It has beenVs Conventional Model.
5 6 7 8 9 10
)
34.15 31.90 30.66 30.16 30.02 30.00
32.73 34.41 35.41 35.85 35.98 36.00
t Step 8)
40.17 38.25 36.27 34.23 32.14 30.00
28.87 30.18 31.55 32.98 34.46 36.00
Conventional Model.
5 6 7 8 9 10
252.59 271.49 286.49 295.53 299.23 300.00
315.42 287.97 267.26 255.45 250.89 250.00
p 9)
228.72 239.87 252.62 266.92 282.72 300.00
353.83 337.06 318.20 297.35 274.60 250.00
odel with flexible negotiation strategies for agent based negotiations in dynamic
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Figure 1 Offer value of Negotiation Issue ‘Price’ – Our Model Vs Conventional Model.
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Figure 2 Offer value of Negotiation Issue ‘Warranty’ – Our Model Vs Conventional Model.
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Figure 3 Offer value of Negotiation Issue ‘Price’ – Our Model Vs Conventional Model with r = 200.
Mathematical model with flexible strategies for agent based negotiations 9proved that when applying the parameter ‘pap’, the traders are
able to reach consensus which is otherwise not possible as
shown in Figs. 7 and 8.
The buyer agent accepts or rejects a proposal by computing
the numerical score of the seller’s proposal and comparing itPlease cite this article in press as: Haleema, P.K., Iyengar, N.C.S.N. A mathematical m
e-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer and Informwith the numerical score of its subsequent counter proposal.
The numerical score of a proposal/counter proposal at the
buyer end is computed using Eq. (7). If the numerical score
of the seller’s proposal is greater than or equal to that of the
buyer’s counter proposal then the proposal is accepted.odel with flexible negotiation strategies for agent based negotiations in dynamic
ation Sciences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2016.11.004
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Figure 4 Offer value of Negotiation Issue ‘Warranty’ – Our Model Vs Conventional Model with r = 200.
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Figure 5 Offer value of Negotiation Issue ‘Price’ – Our Model Vs Conventional Model with c ji ¼ 0:5.
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Figure 6 Offer value of Negotiation Issue ‘Warranty’ – Our Model Vs Conventional Model with c ji ¼ 0:5.
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Table 5 Computation of offer value for the issue ‘Price’ – Without ‘pap’ Vs With ‘pap’.
Concession Steps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Negotiation Issue ‘Price’ – Without ‘pap’
Buyer 201.58 207.02 217.66 233.49 252.59 271.49 286.49 295.53 299.23 300.00
Seller 497.01 487.48 469.72 444.51 415.42 387.97 367.26 355.45 350.89 350.00
Negotiation Issue ‘Price’ – With ‘pap’
Buyer 201.58 207.02 217.66 233.49 252.59 271.49 286.49 295.53 299.23 360.00
Seller 497.01 487.48 469.72 444.51 415.42 387.97 367.26 355.45 350.89 350.00
Table 6 Computation of offer value for the issue ‘Warranty’ – Without ‘pap’ Vs With ‘pap’.
Concession Steps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Negotiation Issue ‘Warranty’ – Without ‘pap’
Buyer 46.86 44.42 41.02 37.35 34.15 31.90 30.66 30.16 30.02 30.00
Seller 18.30 19.00 20.05 21.25 22.37 23.21 23.71 23.93 23.99 24.00
Negotiation Issue ‘Warranty’ – With ‘pap’
Buyer 46.86 44.42 41.02 37.35 34.15 31.90 30.66 30.16 30.02 24.00
Seller 18.30 19.00 20.05 21.25 22.37 23.21 23.71 23.93 23.99 24.00
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Figure 7 Negotiation Issue ‘Price’ – Without ‘pap’ Vs With ‘pap’.
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Figure 8 Negotiation Issue ‘Warranty’ – Without ‘pap’ Vs With ‘pap’.
Mathematical model with flexible strategies for agent based negotiations 11Otherwise, the buyer agent either generates the counter pro-
posal or exits from the negotiation process depending upon
the negotiation deadline. Fig. 9 displays the MATLAB code
for computing the numerical score of the buyer’s and seller’sPlease cite this article in press as: Haleema, P.K., Iyengar, N.C.S.N. A mathematical m
e-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer and Informproposals/counter proposals at the buyer end (offer value com-
putation based upon our model and conventional model) and
to plot the graph against these two values. Figs. 10–12 depict
the graphs comparing our model and the conventional modelsodel with flexible negotiation strategies for agent based negotiations in dynamic
ation Sciences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2016.11.004
Figure 9 MATLAB code for computing the numerical score of the proposals (Our Model/Conventional Model).
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Figure 10 Numerical Score of the Buyer’s Proposal Vs Seller’s Proposal when r = 10.
12 P.K. Haleema, N.Ch.S.N. Iyengarfor the numerical score of both the buyer’s and seller’s propos-
als in different negotiation scenarios with r = 10, r = 200 and
c ji ¼ 0:5 respectively.
4. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, a mathematical model with flexible negotiation
strategies is developed which can be applied suitably inPlease cite this article in press as: Haleema, P.K., Iyengar, N.C.S.N. A mathematical m
e-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer and Informmulti-lateral, multi-issue e-commerce negotiation environ-
ments that are based upon either a number of negotiation
rounds or a specific time limit. This model is novel in its
approach in computation of offer values for the negotiation
issues. The advantage of our approach is evaluated in different
negotiation scenarios with hypothetical data and the experi-
mental results prove that our model enables the traders to
reach consensus much quicker than the existing approachesodel with flexible negotiation strategies for agent based negotiations in dynamic
ation Sciences (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jksuci.2016.11.004
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Figure 11 Numerical Score of the Buyer’s Proposal Vs Seller’s Proposal when r = 200.
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Figure 12 Numerical Score of the Buyer’s Proposal Vs Seller’s Proposal when r = 10 and c ji ¼ 0:5.
Mathematical model with flexible strategies for agent based negotiations 13and it also improves the utility of the traders. The proposed
model is also advantageous in its approach in considering
the compelling urge of the trader in buying/selling a product.
This feature of our model helps the traders in completing a
deal which is otherwise not possible. On the whole, the empir-
ical study proves that the proposed model when compared
with the existing strategies improves the rate of reaching con-
sensus and also increases the utility of both buyer and seller.
However, this model has currently considered only the
negotiation issues that are quantitative and in the future it will
also include the representation of qualitative issues that take
linguistic values. The negotiation procedures and tactics in
auction based e-commerce environments are different from
typical bargaining scenarios. The negotiation strategies pro-
posed in this model are applicable in bilateral/multilateral bar-
gaining scenarios which cannot be applied as such in auction
based e-commerce environments. Thus, this model will be
extended in the future to define negotiation strategies thatPlease cite this article in press as: Haleema, P.K., Iyengar, N.C.S.N. A mathematical m
e-commerce environments. Journal of King Saud University – Computer and Informare suitable for online auction houses. In this paper, the per-
formance of the proposed model is evaluated in a bilateral
negotiation scenario with the hypothetical data. In the future,
the proposed negotiation strategies will be embedded in JADE
agents and their performance in both bilateral and multilateral
negotiation scenarios involving two or more participants will
be evaluated and compared.
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